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The Ostrogothic Defence of the Hesperia.
Contested Borders, Contested Loyalties
After Theoderic the Great had effectively taken the place of the Western Roman Emperor,
he based his border defence on late Roman designs, but adapted it to the new situation
he faced. While claiming Raetia and Noricum for his realm he established little direct
presence, relying on local troops and a shadow of hierarchy. This contributed to the northern
border being fuzzy. Contrasting this with the Balkans border highlights the effect a direct
presence of Theoderic’s troops had in the long run. The attempt to establish clear borders
against opposition from the Eastern Roman Empire forced many local powers to realign
their allegiances. Whereas the fuzziness of the northern border stabilized the region, the
clear but contested borders on the Balkans eventually destabilized the region.
Military History; Gothic History; Late Antiquity; Early Middle Ages; Border Conflict;
Theoderic; Loyalties
Nachdem Theoderich im Westen des Römischen Reiches eine kaiserähnliche Stellung
übernahm, organisierte er auch seine Grenzverteidigung nach spätrömischen Mustern. Er
passte sie jedoch seiner spezifischen Lageeinschätzung an. Bei der Eingliederung Raetiens
begnügte er sich mit einem Schatten der Hierarchie, statt direkter Kontrolle, und überließ
lokalen Truppen weitgehend die Verteidigung. Im Gegensatz dazu besetzte Theoderich
seine Ostgrenze auf dem Balkan mit eigenen Truppen und konfrontierte das Ostreich.
Als Folge dessen mussten lokale Akteure ihre Politik neu ausrichten. Während die indi-
rekte Herrschaftsausübung im Norden die Situation stabilisierte, führte der Versuch der
direkten Kontrolle und klarer Grenzen auf dem Balkan langfristig zur Destabilisierung
der Region.
Militärgeschichte; Gotische Geschichte; Spätantike; Frühmittelalter; Grenzkonflikte; Theo-
derich; Treueverhältnisse
1 Defending the North
The provinces of Raetia are the bars and bolts of Italy. Wild and cruel nations
ramp outside of them, and they, like nets, whence their name, catch the barbarian
in their toils and hold him there till the hurled arrow can chastise his madness.
Receive then for this indiction the ducatus Raetiarum. Let your soldiers live on
friendly terms with the provincials, avoiding all lawless presumption and at the
same time let them be constantly on their guard against the barbarians outside.
Even bloodshed is often prevented by seasonable vigilance.1
These words could have been spoken by a later Roman Emperor when appointing a duke
(dux) for his northern borders. This particular letter was indeed written by Cassiodorus,
1 Cassiod. Var. 7,4: […] Raetiae namque munimina sunt Italiae et claustra provinciae: quae non immerito sic
appellata esse iudicamus, quando contra feras et agrestissimas gentes velut quaedam plagarum obstacula disponuntur.
ibi enim impetus gentilis excipitur et transmissis iaculis sauciatur furibunda praesumptio. sic gentilis impetus vestra
venatio est et ludo geritis quod vos assidue feliciter egisse sentitis. […] Quapropter responde nostro iudicio, fide nobis
et industria placiturus, ut nec gentiles sine discussione suscipias nec nostros ad gentes sub incuriositate transmittas.
ad necessitatem siquidem rarius venitur armorum, ubi suscepta surreptio custodiri posse sentitur. privilegia vero
dignitatis tuae nostris tibi iussionibus vindicabis. (Translation Hodgkin 1889, 322).
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who rose through the ranks of the late Roman civil administration up the Pretorian
Prefecture. However it was written in the name of King Theoderic the Great, himself
often called a Barbarian. Although this letter is a formula with a blanket for the name of
the duke to be filled in, it had a very real application since we know of more letters in
which Theoderic addressed his border commanders, including the Duke of Raetia. They
tell a lot about the organization and defence of the late Roman Empire and its Ostrogothic
successor. At first glance it seems little had changed. This paper examines the elements of
continuity and especially discontinuity, and goes on highlighting the stark differences in
the governance of the northern and the eastern borders of the Ostrogothic Kingdom.
There was no longer an Emperor in Ravenna. The federate military officer Odoaker
deposed Emperor Romulus Augustus in 476 CE. The Western Emperors had gradually
lost the West, the Hesperia, during the 5th century. The power in former provinces resided
in the hands of various Barbarian kings, who usually claimed one legitimacy or another,
awarded by some Emperor. They still did not dare minting gold coins, and they respected
Roman senators greatly, as they needed them for their civil administration. When the
same finally happened in Italy, it was so unremarkable that it largely went unnoticed
by contemporaries and it must be stressed that Roman people still saw themselves as
inhabitants of the Roman Empire.2 For many years Odoaker continued to rule in the
name of the Emperor who had once appointed him to office, Julius Nepos. In 489 CE
however the Eastern Roman Emperor Zeno sent one of his most ambitious and thus most
dangerous officers west to reclaim Italy: the master of the western armies (magister militum
praesentalis) Theoderic with his federate command of the Goths, the exercitus Gothorum.
Theoderic could boast Roman citizenship, the consulate of 484 CE, and a patricius-title.
He again officially ruled the Western Roman res publica in the name of the new Eastern
Emperor Anastasius.3 He extended his sphere of influence by driving the Vandals out of
Sicily, re-establishing control of the Danube provinces, conquering southern Gaul and
reinstalling the Gallic Prefecture, and taking the Visigothic kingship in Spain for rather
dubious pretexts during a civil war. One can argue a lot from a legal – Staatsrecht – point
of view, but it cannot be doubted that Theoderic had practically restored the Hesperia and
that he was vastly more powerful than any Western Emperor in the fifty years preceding
his assumption of power. Despite officially shying away from the title, he was hailed as a
Roman Emperor,4 presented himself as such and took on corresponding responsibilities5
– including the defence of borders, which had been ill-defended for generations.
The Vita Severini for example reports a most desolate state of the Danubian defences;
the few soldiers left there were no longer paid and had little motivation. Odoaker had even
recalled more troops to Italy, leaving the borders wide open.6 Cassiodorus’s letters give
the impression that Theoderic actually cared for the northern provinces and strengthened
their defences. While these letters also need to be read with care and will be analysed
in depth later on, Theoderic’s decision makes geostrategic sense: as Herwig Wolfram
outlined long ago, the strategy for the defence of Italy – and the Hesperia as well for that
2 Cf. Börm 2013, 112–117.
3 Cf. Wolfram 2001, 278–288; Wolfram 1967, 47; Mommsen 1889, 506–507.
4 Cf. ILS 827: D(ominus) N(oster) gl(o)r(io)s(issi)mus adq(ue) / inclyt(us) / Rex Theodericus / Vict(or) Ac Tri /
umf(ator) semper Aug(ustus) / bono R(ei) P(ublicae) natus / custos libertatis / et pro / pagator Rom(ani) nom(inis)
/ domitor g(en)tium.
5 Cf. Heydemann 2016, 20–24; Arnold 2014, 88–91; O’Donnell 2008, 144–147.
6 Vita Severini 20; of course this text needs to be read with extreme care and should not be taken too
literally as it aims at highlighting the achievements of Severus at a time when the region was all but
deserted by the government, in this case represented by Odoaker. The actual extent of the military retreat
from this region is open to debate, as is the question of whether this order to retreat from the province
of Noricum was also issued to the troops in other Danubian provinces. However it does seem that the
Roman military defences along the Danube had been gradually deteriorating since the mid-5th century,
cf. Schwarcz 2015, 26–28.
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matter – rested on Raetia, so that Theoderic relied on a trifold system consisting of a chain
of fortresses along the southern Alps which was most likely based on the tractus Italiae circa
Alpes of Notitia Dignitatum fame, the Duchies of Raetia and Noricum under his control,
and allies in front of these duchies.7
It is noteworthy that the dukes of Raetia and Noricum seemed to have their own
troops at their disposal, rather than troops from the exercitus Gothorum. In fact, the dukes
themselves were likely not Goths but Roman citizens; at least they had Roman names.
Theoderic addressed a duke named Servatus whose troops were explicitly not Goths:
It is your duty to repress all violence and injustice in the Provinces over which
you preside. Maniarius complains that his slaves have been without any cause
taken away from him by the Breones, who are continuing in peace the habits and
maxims of war.8
Servatus as duke9 commands a military unit called Breones, who had obviously gone on
looting the provincials they ought to protect, and Servatus must bring them to justice.
This is a quite typical problem of ancient military formations,10 and the main intent of
the letter is to illustrate that Theoderic takes care of this problem even when alerted by
an otherwise unknown person from a border region. Indeed the crown was well aware
that the economic success of the provincials was pivotal to paying the soldiers, and thus
considered such looting counterproductive.11 The information about the perpetrators
being Breones is nonetheless important. They were a local mountain people who by that
time had long been Romanized, and seemingly now formed a military unit tasked with
defending these mountains.12 Another hint to the local ties of the duke and his troops is
the simple fact that they never left their homes. There were massive troop movements in
the Ostrogothic Kingdom. The exercitus Gothorum proper, the Gothic king’s main force,
fought everywhere: from Sicily to Gaul, from Spain to the Balkans.13 However, the border
troops of Raetia did not move anywhere, not even when the Gothic Wars raged on as the
Eastern Empire under the new Emperor Justinian went on to conquer Italy from the
Gothic Kings in the 6th century. The border troops remained in place and continued to
guard their lands, apparently almost heedless of who ruled Italy.
It seems that the neighbouring province of Noricum had a similar design. We know
of a high ranking (vir spectabilis) man named Ursus, whose identity is not entirely certain.
However with such a rank, he could have been the duke of Noricum. His name means
male bear and that of his wife Ursina means female bear. These names are Roman again
and may have been common in the Alpine Roman lands although is this disputed. How-
ever they were definitely Catholics, which – despite a few converts – strongly implies that
they were not Gothic.14 It seems again they were mostly local troops, but the information
is very sparse here. Archaeological evidence for the presence of Goths north of the Alps
7 Cf. Wolfram 2001, 315–317. Also Beyerle 1962, 66–71, putting a greater emphasis on Alemannia.
8 Cassiod. Var. 1,11: Quapropter Moniarii supplicatione commoti praesentibus te affamur oraculis, ut, si re vera
mancipia eius Breones irrationabiliter cognoveris abstulisse, qui militaribus officiis assueti civilitatem premere
dicuntur armati et ob hoc iustitiae parere despiciunt, quoniam ad bella Martia semper intendunt, dum nescio quo
pacto assidue dimicantibus difficile est morum custodire mensuram. (Translation Hodgkin 1889, 151).
9 Cf. Amory 1997, 414–415.
10 Cf. Fear 2008, 439.
11 Cf. Cassiod. Var. 8,26,4.
12 Cf. Glaser 2008, 613–614.
13 Today, there is still no comprehensive military history of the exercitus Gothorum, yet the narratives of
Procopius and Agathias as well as Cassiodorus’s information clearly outline the high mobility of at least
a core strike force.
14 Cf. Prostko-Prostynski 2002, 297–302, who does not agree on the rank of Ursus. Following Prostko-
Prostyński we know even less about the organisation of Noricum.
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is often limited to female items like fibulae, and generally inconclusive.15 Even most
careful examinations of the province’s few mentions in late 5th and early 6th century
written sources end with little confidence regarding the analysis of its organization be-
yond the very fact that it was considered to be Theoderic’s sphere of influence, at least
from Ravenna’s point of view.16
Looking at the troop movements and organization, the pattern is familiar: we have
rather immobile local troops on the borders under the command of their local lords, a
mobile strike force under the direct command of the head of state, and beyond that palace
guards. It does not take much to see that the late Roman military practice impinged heav-
ily on the overall structure of the ‘Ostrogothic’ military and the design of the Kingdom’s
defences.17 The level of continuity is so strong in this respect that the palace guards appear
to be militarily useless gatherings of Senatorial teenagers, who did not guard much and
were even supervised by civilian, not military, officers.18
It should not come as a surprise that the army structure was entirely late Roman,
because Theoderic was a Roman army general, the exercitus Gothorum was a Roman fed-
erate command operating on Roman soil for all of its existence. Instead of a diffuse
reference to obscure tribal practices, the late Roman context offers a far more sensible
background for the military organization. The most obvious change was the replacement
of the comitatenses by a federate army, serving the same role within the system.
The letters of Cassiodorus allow us to understand how this military would have re-
acted to enemy incursions, in theory at least. We do not know the armament, or tactics,
of the border guarding limitanei, but it seems they were not expected to hold out against
noteworthy forces. Delaying the enemy advance by harassing him in the mountains,
perhaps blocking passes, and defending key fortresses were the prime tasks of the border
defenders. Despite the fancy words of Theoderic about Raetia being the bars and bolts
of Italy, it seems he was perfectly aware that an army could easily slip through that net.
The tractus Italiae, the chain of fortresses at the foot of the Southern Alps, was reinforced;
well-known are two fortresses, Verruca and Dertona. But again, they were not designed
to stop the enemy:
Advised by the calculation of public utility, a care which is always a welcome bur-
den to me, I command that the castle sited near you be strengthened, since matters
of war are well ordered when planned in time of peace. Indeed, a fortification is
made especially strong when reinforced by prolonged planning. Anything done
15 Jirík 2012, 338; Bierbrauer 2010, 94–95. An interesting side note is that Theoderic once ordered his saio
Duda to take away the gold items from the graves of rich people, cf. Cassiod. Var. 4,34. This seems to
have been an emergency order and not standard practice though, cf. Nelsen 1978, 112–113.
16 Arnold 2016, 78–89.
17 Doubts have again been raised, of whether a division between semi-autonomous local forces and the
exercitus Gothorum really existed, given that the ducal troops were never properly addressed as limitanei
but rather milites, which technically could mean they were part of the field army too, cf. Halsall 2016,
186. While a valid caveat – especially since even the late Roman distinction between comitatenses and
limitanei can be doubted (Le Bohec 2010, 171–184) – the absence of clear terminology should not be
overstated; late Roman border troops were not always referred to as limitanei (or riparienses and the likes).
Their assignment and duties marked them as borderers, cf. Southern and Dixon 1996, 55; Isaac 1988, 146.
This is probably the case with the ducal troops in question, and even if they were not ‘true’ limitanei they
certainly acted as a functional equivalent to them. Ultimately, this is the most important aspect when
trying to understand their role in the Ostrogothic military organization.
18 Cf. Cassiod. Var. 6,6,1; 8,12,8. The development of late Roman palace guards from elite forces to mere
show units, or units in which service was prestigious but harmless and far from any enemy, repeated itself
a few times, cf. Mommsen 1879. Theoderic probably thought it was wise giving the Roman aristocracy
some honours by employing their youths as palace guards, but Justinian radically disbanded these units
upon his conquest of Italy; he even wanted the money that they had been paid all these years paid back,
cf. Proc. Anec. 26, 27–30.
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in haste is evidently ill-advised, and it is a bad thing to demand building on a site
when danger is already feared. […] What an advantage it will be to live in your
own homes, while the enemy endures the harshest quarters! He will be exposed
to the rains; you will be shielded by a roof; hunger will gnaw him; you will be
refreshed by your stores. So, while you remain in perfect safety, your enemy will
suffer the fate of the loser before the battle is fought. For clearly, in time of need,
he who is not distracted among many cares will be proved the bravest. For could
anyone suppose a man wise if he starts to build or lay up supplies only when he
should be thinking of war?19
The fortress thus serves a dual purpose: it is to shelter to own civil population but also to
deny shelter to an enemy. It forces a foreign army to invest part of their time and resources
to forage, leaving them exposed not only to the elements but also to an impending counter
attack. Since Dertona lies deep in Italy, it is inappropriate to think of lines of defence,
because this would be the very inner-most line – if there was one. Gothic strategy should
be understood in terms of space. An invader may advance through it, but he cannot
get anything there. Hence there is no hard border to crack and no soft core to exploit
afterwards. Even in the middle of the Italian peninsula there were dedicated fortresses of
no civilian use.
This can be observed in the later stages of the First Gothic War between 537 and
540 CE. Justinian’s general Belisarius had landed in southern Italy and worked his way
north. The Gothic field army could not prevent him from taking Rome, which it then
besieged. The losses were horrendous and the Gothic army had to retreat before Belisarius.
That retreat is interesting, because – from Rome to Ravenna – suddenly a number of
fortresses were (re-) activated, to which the Gothic troops fell back. These were mostly old
ones guarding passes and roads. For example there was Petra at the via Flaminia. Although
the exact location remains unknown, we have a good description of it, situated between
a river crossing and a mountain:
for the end of the rock reaches to the very stream of the river, affording no room
for those who travel that way to pass by. So the men of ancient times constructed a
tunnel at that point, and made there a gate for the place. And they also closed up
the greatest part of the entrance, leaving only enough space for a small gate there
also, and thus rendered the place a natural fortress, which they call by the fitting
name of Petra.20
19 Cassiod. Var. 1,17: Publicae utilitatis ratione commoniti, quae nos cura semper libenter oneravit, castrum iuxta vos
positum praecipimus communiri, quia res proeliorum bene disponitur, quotiens in pace tractatur. munitio quippe
tunc efficitur praevalida, si diutina fuerit excogitatione roborata. omnia subita probantur incauta et male constructio
loci tunc quaeritur, quando iam pericula formidantur. [2] Adde quod animus ipse in audaciam non potest esse
pronus, qui diversa cura fuerit sollicitus. hanc merito expeditionem nominavere maiores, quia mens devota proeliis
non debet aliis cogitationibus occupari. quapropter amplectenda res est, quae generalitatis consideratione praecipitur,
nec moram fas est incurrere iussionem, quae devotos maxime noscitur adiuvare. [3] Et ideo praesenti auctoritate
decernimus, ut domos vobis in praedicto castello alacriter construatis, reddentes animo nostro vicissitudinem rerum,
ut, sicut nos vestris utilitatibus profutura censemus, ita tempora nostra ornare vos pulcherrimis fabricis sentianius.
tunc enim accidit, ut et sumptus competentes vestris iam penatibus congregare velitis et habitatio vobis non sit ingrata,
quam propria potest commendare constructio. [4] Quale est, rogo, in laribus propriis esse, cum durissimas mansiones
hostis cogitur sustinere? ille imbribus pateat, vos tecta defendant: illum inedia consumat, vos copia provisa reficiat.
sic vobis tutissime constitutis hostis vester ante eventum certaminis fata patiebitur perditoris. constat enim tempore
necessitatis illum probari fortissimum virum, qui se per multa non distrahit. nam quis eum habuisse prudentiam
putet, si tunc coeperit fabricis operam dare aut penum condere, cum oporteat bella tractare? (Translation Barnish
1992, 14–15).
20 Proc. Bella 6,11, 12–14: […] λήγουσα γὰρ ἡ πέτρα ἐς αὐτόν που μάλιστα τοῦ ποταμοῦ τὸν ῥοῦν διήκει,
διάβασιν τοῖς ταύτῃ ἰοῦσιν οὐδεμίαν παρεχομένη. [13] διώρυχα τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα οἱ πάλαι ἄνθρωποι
ἐργασάμενοι, πυλίδα τῷ χωρίῳ ταύτῃ πεποίηνται. [14] φράξαντες δὲ καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας εἰσόδου τὸ
The Ostrogothic Defence of the Hesperia 217
Those men “of ancient times” in the text often indicate that we are dealing with a generic
literary convention, a topos, but in this special case we know from Aurelius Victor that
those ancient men were the engineers of Emperor Vespasian.21 This means a 450-year-old
fortress in the heartland of Italy was still in good enough shape to form part of the Gothic
defences. We can therefore assume that the fortress had been maintained continuously,
even if at a minimal level, for centuries. Again this is an element of continuity, rather than
being novel. Although the image of the Empire fighting Barbarians on its outer borders
was fostered by Roman authors, already Vespasian – the old general – knew war was every
bit as common on the Empire’s ground; be it civil war, rebellion or barbarian incursion.
Perhaps Theoderic’s own experiences when invading Italy and defeating Odoaker also
prompted thinking in terms of spaces rather than in lines. After he crossed the Isonzo-
river on August 28, 489 CE, it took him only about five weeks to get to Milan, despite a
battle in late September.22 If we compare that to the expected average marching speed of
Roman legions, which is somewhere between sixteen and twenty Roman miles (24–30
km) a day,23 he was barely slowed down in his advance – just two weeks24 – despite being
in the middle of the tractus Italiae, the chain of fortresses. He thus knew fortifications
would not stop an enemy. It was the field army which needed to strike.
This strategy had severe consequences for the border regions. The Gothic field army,
while highly mobile by the standards of Late Antiquity, could never react in time to cross
the Alps and protect the provinces of Raetia against smaller incursions. The locals were on
their own, and Theoderic made sure they knew they were on their own militarily unless
a great invasion happened. However there was the shadow of hierarchy (or perhaps rather
a functional equivalent to it), to use a term from political science. In case of a full scale
invasion, but also in the event of a major uprising, Theoderic and his troops could act with
terrifying efficiency as demonstrated in many theatres of war.25 This kind of deterrent
meant the locals would need to fight most of their small battles alone when subjected
to a raid, but this strategy was far more credible than trying to achieve a permanent,
direct presence. This would have served only to overstretch the available forces and have
anyway failed to protect anything. While Theoderic’s system of indirect presence, which
at times may have been little more than symbolic domination, did nothing to prevent
small scale incursions it was a credible enough threat stabilizing the region on a grander
scale while leaving it largely independent. It is thus not a symptom of military weakness,
as has been argued when reviewing the apparently low quality and numbers of the ducal
troops.26 It should not be forgotten that fending off small scale incursions, and not full
scale invasions, was precisely what local border guards were supposed to do anyway. In
πλεῖστον, πλήν γε δὴ ὅσον πυλίδα κἀνταῦθα λελεῖφθαι, φρούριόν τε αὐτοφυὲς ἀπειργάσαντο καὶ
Πέτραν αὐτὸ λόγῳ τῷ εἰκότι ἐκάλεσαν. (Translation Dewing 1919, 383).
21 Cf. Epit. 9.
22 Cf. Fasti Vind. Prior. A.490; Cassiod. Chron. a.489; An. Val. 2,50.
23 Cf. Thorne 2007, 226.
24 Walter Scheidel’s program Stanford Geospatial Network Model of the Roman World gives an impression,
however debatable, what those abstract numbers actually could mean.
25 Cf. Börzel and Risse 2010, 115–118. The concept itself needs some adaption to work for the late Antiquity
since it was developed describing the relation between present-day non-state actors and the state, espe-
cially in non-hierarchical rulemaking. Even disregarding the vexed question of whether ‘states’ existed in
antiquity, cf. Patzold 2012, 406–442; Pohl 2006, 9–29; Wiemer 2006, 1–4, decision- and rulemaking was
predominantly hierarchical. However, having a greater power which by its sheer potential to markedly
influence processes already affects these processes is something that can be observed in late antique Raetia
as well. This works as functionally equivalent to a shadow of hierarchy.
26 Cf. Claude 1997, 417.
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the end, it was a win-win situation, the borders gained relatively high stability, and the
heartlands gained their bars and bolts.27
This would explain why the northern borders in particular are so extremely fuzzy. The
precise extent to which the Gothic Kingdom exercised control north of the Alps simply
cannot be determined. Yet considering his system of indirect presence and the shadow
of hierarchy it did not much matter as long – as Theoderic could claim the old Roman
provinces to be under his control and restored to the Roman res publica he headed.
2 Trade, gifts, and non-military interaction
Due to a lack of sources it is hard to make definite statements about the intensity or
importance of the trade the Gothic Kingdom had with its neighbours. Even the relevance
of the very question of whether the overall economy under Theoderic recovered or fur-
ther declined can be disputed.28 Numismatic evidence could perhaps indicate that the
northern provinces traded a lot more with the south and the centre of the Gothic King-
dom than with their western and northern neighbours.29 The literary evidence rests on
Cassiodorus’s letters, which are certainly not representative for the trade as such, because
the ones dealing with it are best interpreted in a context of political interaction. In this,
Theoderic is portrayed as some kind of a senior king in the west, advising although not
directly commanding the lesser kings of neighbouring realms. As such, Theoderic’s court
inevitably appears to be the centre point of all trading action, always receiving more than
giving.
Despite this caveat, some most interesting letters reveal details otherwise lost, espe-
cially about trade goods, their origin and value:
A well-furnished royal table is a credit to the State. A private person may eat only
the produce of his own district; but it is the glory of a King to collect at his table
the delicacies of all lands. Let the Danube send us her carp, let the salmon come
from the Rhine, and let the labour of Sicily furnish the lamprey […]; in short, let
well-flavoured dishes be gathered from all coasts.30
This letter not only tells us about the most diverse sorts of fish enjoyed at court. The
salmon from the Rhine – if the translation of anchorago as such is correct31 – is noteworthy
not so much because this species is almost extinct nowadays, but because the Rhine
is another old border of the Western Roman Empire like the Danube. Implicitly – yet
perfectly clearly – Theoderic outlines his sphere of influence by dishing out this collection
of fish acquired through trade, gifts and tribute.
Another letter of note is about the gift of swords, which the King of the Varni made
to Theoderic:
27 Such a design would also be supported by recent research highlighting the continuity of substructures
in the duchy itself, rather than that of overlaying superregional (pseudo-)imperial structures of the late
Roman, Gothic or Frankish administrations, and the importance of the ducal, rather than imperial,
identity for the local population, cf. Esders 2012.
28 Cf. Claude 1996, 42–44.
29 Cf. Beyerle 1962, 71.
30 Cassiod. Var. 12,4,2: Mensae regalis apparatus ditissimus non parvus rei publicae probatur ornatus, quia tanta
dominus possidere creditur, quantis novitatibus epulatur. privati est habere quod locus continet: in principali convivio
hoc profecto decet exquiri, quod visum debeat ammirari. destinet carpam Danuvius, a Rheno veniat anchorago,
exormiston Sicula quibuslibet laboribus offeratur: Bruttiorum mare dulces mittat acernias: sapori pisces de diversis
finibus afferantur. (Translation Hodgkin 1889, 490–491, slightly modified by the author).
31 Cf. Heuberger 1937, 98.
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You send us swords, which can even penetrate armour and which we praise for
their steel rather than for their golden hilts. With their strikingly perfect polish,
they shine so brightly that they reflect the face of whoever looks at them. Their
perfectly formed edges are so regular that one would believe they were fashioned
with a file rather than hammered in the forge. The admirably hollowed middle
part of their blades seems to be veined and patterned. There is the play of so many
different shadows that one would think the metal is interlaced with elements of
various colours. The beauty of these swords is such that one is tempted to attribute
them to Vulcan, of whom they say that he forges with such skill that whatever
comes from his hand is not the work of a mortal, but of a god.32
This is a perfect description of a so-called Goldgriff-Spatha. This kind of longsword – pattern
welded and golden hilted – was not a rank and file weapon,33 so this letter is not about
arms trade in the traditional sense of arming troops. The Goths controlled the most likely
still functional west-Roman fabricae-facilities which would have provided them with am-
ple weapons anyway. This kind of sword is a diplomatic message, being military high-tech
as well as status symbol. Again Theoderic positions himself as the senior king receiving
these splendid gifts, but it is equally important that he judges them favourably showing
his appreciation and understanding of the craftsmanship as well as for the gesture itself.
Curiously, in their dealings with the north, Theoderic and his advisors used a language
that emphasized the difference between the culturally superior Roman Empire and the
wild barbarians in the north. The Goths, while not Roman citizens themselves for the
most part, were nonetheless styled to be the defenders of the res publica. And the barbarians
in the north were still portrayed with all the old topoi known from centuries of Roman
ethnographic and historiographic traditions:
Think what a life of hardship the soldier leads in those frontier forts for the general
peace, thus, as the gate of the Province, shutting out the entry of the barbarian
nations. He must be ever on the alert who seeks to keep out the Barbarians. For
fear alone checks these men, who honour [to the treaties] will not keep back.34
However, this kind of rhetoric mostly served representing Theoderic’s regime to the Ro-
mans as a continuation of Roman traditions and policies more than it really impinged
on his strategy. It is no surprise that Theoderic avoided such topoi in his letters to the
Thuringians for example. Still he placed himself in the de-facto position of Roman Em-
peror, who as wise father guided the cause of the other kingdoms, which he considered
subordinate.35
32 Cassiod. Var. 5,1,1–2: […] spathas nobis etiam arma desecantes vestra fraternitas destinavit, ferro magis quam
auri pretio ditiores. splendet illic claritas expolita ut intuentium facies fideli puritate restituant, quarum margines
in acutum tali aequalitate descendunt, ut non limis compositae, sed igneis fornacibus credantur effusae. harum
media pulchris alveis excavata quibusdam videntur crispari posse vermiculis: ubi tanta varietatis umbra conludit,
ut intextum magis credas variis coloribus lucidum metallum. [2] Hoc vestra cotis diligenter emundat, hoc vester
splendidissimus pulvis ita industriose detergit, ut speculum quoddam virorum faciat ferream lucem, qui ideo patriae
vestrae natura largiente concessus est, ut huius rei opinionem vobis faceret singularem: enses, qui pulchritudine sui
putentur esse Vulcani, qui tanta elegantia fabrilia visus est excolere, ut quod eius manibus formabatur, non opus
mortalium, sed crederetur esse divinum. (Translation by author).
33 Cf. Ament 1998, 333–335. Ironically no Ostrogothic sword, much less a Goldgriff-Spatha, has been found
because the Goths were buried without weapons. Nevertheless their neighbours, the Franks and Ale-
manni, left a number of contemporary swords which illustrate the precision of Cassiodorus’s description.
Furthermore they are likely to be heavily influenced by the Gothic swords, cf. Menghin 1983, 166.
34 Cassiod. Var. 2,5,2: Decet enim cogitare de militis transactione, qui pro generali quiete finalibus locis noscitur
insudare et quasi a quadam porta provinciae gentiles introitus probatur excludere. in procinctu semper erit, qui
barbaros prohibere contendit, quia solus metus cohibet, quos fides promissa non retinet. (Translation Hodgkin
1889, 174).
35 Cf. Cassiod. Var. 4,1.
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3 A clear border. The Balkans
The focal point of the Balkans border region was the city of Sirmium, which had once
belonged to the Western Roman Empire, but was effectively under Eastern control for
a long time. However, with the Eastern preoccupation with the Persians and incursions
into Thrace, the city was taken by Gepids during the later 5th century.36 Theoderic decided
to reclaim it for the Hesperia, and his general Pitzias swiftly conquered the city from the
Gepids in 504 CE.37 While the Senate in Rome cheered loudly that the Hesperia was whole
again, the Emperor in Constantinople was furious for he considered the city his, albeit just
not currently under his control. The result was a clash between Theoderic and Emperor
Anastasius.38 And the mere prospect of military action realigned the allegiances across
the Balkans borders almost immediately.
It was not only the border between the Eastern and the Western parts of the Empire,
but also various peoples to the north. The Gepids around Sirmium were beaten, but the
Bulgars offered their troops to the Emperor, whereas a certain general named Mundo
allied himself with Theoderic. Mundo claimed to be a descendant of Attila and had
created his own little rogue dominion with the help of mercenaries and lost soldiers of
vanquished kingdoms, including Gepids. Initially called a king of thieves (rex grassato-
rum),39 he had chosen the right side at the right time and officially became a federate
commander of Theoderic, which is ironic considering Theoderic himself was technically
only a federate commander of the Emperor against whom he was fighting just at that
time.40 Despite another Gothic victory in 510 CE and the constant presence of potent
Gothic field army units, the situation remained volatile. Mundo was but one factor in
a highly militarized border region where Gothic, Gepid, Lombard, Bulgar and Eastern
Roman forces cautiously watched each other, waiting for a chance to strike at each other,
with the help of each other. In 530 CE resurgent Gepids saw their time had come and
attacked the Goths; however, a successful Gothic counterattack took the opportunity to
not just repulse them but also grab an Eastern Roman city in the process.
The seemingly stronger presence of cities in the Balkans marks a difference to the
north where cities had shrunken massively, sometimes to the extent of insignificance.41
Since the Balkans also saw a process of de-urbanization, perhaps one more dramatic,42 this
stronger presence is best attributed to the stronger focus of our narrative sources on the
region and the wars waged there. The remaining cities were all the more important. The
lower dispersion of the local population in areas dominated by a city, its economic impact
there, and its symbolic importance – the winning of Sirmium in particular boosted the
reputation of its conqueror as governing power43 – heavily influenced the strategies how
to defend the region, almost predetermining campaign goals. On the other hand, the
ongoing development of de-urbanization and the adapting economy might also suggest
that the loss of a city might have been far from a catastrophic setback for the loser on a
purely economic level. Further, when considering the growing number of new fortresses,
36 Cf. Vössing and Milinkovic 2005, 499–502.
37 Cf. Ennod. Pan. 60–62.
38 Cf. Kitchen 2011, 128–129.
39 Cf. Jord. Get. 301.
40 Cf. Ennod. Pan. 62–69; Jord. Get. 300–301; Jord. Rom. 356; Marc. Com. A.505.
41 Nevertheless it can be argued that the administrative structures laid out by the cities sometimes could
remain intact and effective, especially in the regions more closely connected to Italy, even though the size
of the cities itself was reduced, cf. Witschel 2008, 45–46.
42 Cf. Poulter 2004.
43 Cf. Ennod. Pan. 69; Sirmium had been the capital of the province Pannonia II and could look back on
a history of imperial attention until the 5th century, cf. Dey 2014, 15; 60–61. Thus Theoderic’s claim of
renewing this attention contrasted with the Eastern Emperor’s neglect, and once again serves to affirm
his imperial pretensions.
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fortified villages and other strongholds, the military could choose to defend these and thus
compensate the loss of a city. For instance, for Mundo’s base of operations a fortress or a
mere watchtower (turris) named Herta sufficed; he definitely did not need a city.44 Even
Sirmium was not important enough to be without alternative as a military stronghold and
was eventually replaced by a newly built fortress.45 In this changing world, the greatest
worth a city had may perhaps have been the growth of prestige its owner gained simply
by holding it, especially when fewer of them flourished.46
Four years after the war between Gepids and Goths, the new Emperor Justinian re-
taliated, and Mundo switched sides or had done so already, and fought the Goths as the
Emperor’s new master of the Illyrian armies (magister militum per Illyricum).47 As it is fitting
for such an illustrious character, he died in a spectacular battle. Mundo can be analysed
as exemplary in illustrating the shifting identities and the fluidity in the application of
ethnographical terms48 – claiming the names of the Huns, Goths, Gepids, and Romans
– and as example for a leader of a purely plunder-based warrior group,49 yet he is also a
good example of how smaller local forces reacted to the influence of larger superregional
forces in contest.
Unlike in the north, where the Gothic Kingdom had no equal, the situation on the
Balkans is not characterized by fuzzy borders. The borders are clear to each protagonist,
with a few cities being high-visibility markers of their zone of influence, they just could
not settle for a common understanding of where, exactly, the border lay. It proved dis-
astrous that two superpowers – the Gothic one fledging, the East Roman one temporar-
ily weakened – tried to establish, respectively re-establish clear-cut borders with direct
military action against each other. This forced the many smaller powers to constantly
shift their allegiances and resulted in permanent instability that ended with the later,
total destruction of the Gothic military in the wake of the Gothic Wars 535–562 CE.
This, however, is perhaps not the inevitable result of two neighbouring superpowers. The
Romano-Persian border in the east remained relatively stable and peaceful except when a
full-scale war broke out, during which several provinces could be devastated. One should
avoid ‘what-if’ history, but the question of what might have happened had Theoderic used
an indirect approach, as he did in the north, might be worth exploring.
4 Fuzzy borders vs clear borders
When the power exerted by the centres of the western and eastern parts of the Roman
Empire deteriorated massively, reaching the point of total collapse in the west, as a del-
egated army commander, Theoderic stepped in. With him came an agenda aiming for
the territorial restoration of the Hesperia. Ideologically this was supported by ancient
44 Cf. Jord. Get. 301.
45 Cf. Caldwell 2012, 102.
46 On cities and their ideological role in Ostrogothic Italy cf. Marazzi 2016, 105–113.
47 Cf. Amory 1997, 397–399; Krautschik 2002, 382–383. Admittedly, it is not entirely certain that this
Mundo is really identical with the Mundo who sided with Theoderic earlier (cf. PLRE IIIb, 903), but
it seems probable.
48 Cf. Pohl 1980, 290–293.
49 Cf. Berndt 2011, 131–134. However, the extent to which plundering and looting is essential for the
formation and stabilization of this group may be somewhat overstressed. It is a military group first and
foremost, and ancient authors seldom characterized soldiers or mercenaries favourably; in fact sometimes
only through the employer the difference between robbers and soldiers could be seen, cf. Riess 2001, 74.
The line between foraging and plundering can be thin and blurred indeed, especially from the affected
civilians’ point of view. But that is precisely the reason why this point of view should not be our only
means of judging such troops. Their quick integration into regular armies (cf. Burian 1960, 47–49),
which can also be seen in case of Mundo’s men, is vital to understanding how they operated, i.e. in no
way differing from other troops of the time.
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rhetorical topoi and Theoderic’s pretention of taking over the Emperor’s job without
legally taking over his actual position. In practice, he reformed the Roman military system
to fit his own needs and the defence strategy of the Hesperia also betrays a down-to-earth
assessment of the impossibility of truly defending all of it, which differed from the late
Roman strategy of defending everything everywhere. North of the Alps, a mere shadow
of hierarchy had to suffice, offering the reasonable chance that his troops could engage
adequately there. The fuzzy borders in the north may well be deliberate rather than a
sign of weakness. The indirect rule proved to be very fruitful for the centre as well as
for the border region. As the allies beyond the border were reliable, or at least they did
not switch sides, the trade worked reasonably well. The downside was the fact that the
locals in the border region felt little loyalty to Ravenna and remained essentially neutral
during the Gothic Wars of the 6th century. By contrast, the clear Balkans borders and the
attempt to hold them, no matter what, did a lot to destabilize the region permanently. The
shaping of the periphery therefore depended greatly on what mode of achieving political
domination over the realm’s edges was chosen by the centre.
In any case, the defence strategy did not rely on forward defences at the borders. On
the contrary, it was anticipated that neither fortresses nor natural obstacles could hold
an enemy for long. Fortifications were merely intended to deny supply and shelter, while
protecting the population until field army units from the exercitus Gothorum could engage.
Not even an obstacle as massive as the Alps and a chain of fortresses as impressive as the
tractus Italiae made an exception to that rule.50
This strategy was largely vindicated during the Gothic Wars, which could only be
passingly reviewed here, but the simple fact that the Gothic military survived as long as
it did against superior forces is a testimony to the strategy’s effectiveness. It bogged down
the Eastern Roman troops in siege after siege. Its greatest weakness is probably the neglect
of naval affairs, but that topic is out of scope for this paper.
50 It has been argued that the late Roman army pursued a strategy of “defence in depth”, cf. Luttwak 1976,
controversially so and not without massive criticism pointing to the late Roman forward defences (cf.
Mann 1970; Goldsworthy 2005, 154), however even the term itself can be a bit misleading. In modern
military thought it means multi-layered, pre-set defence lines to which troops retreat while giving up land
for time and engaging the enemy with the purpose of slowing him down, cf. Stein 1987. But neither the
late Roman nor the Gothic military would give up the land entirely as the cities and fortifications were
not to fall. No lines of defence can be seen and there is also no evidence that the provincial troops would
retreat out of the provinces to the centre. Lastly the northern provinces of Raetia and Noricum are not
representative for the overall border defence strategy.
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